The voting certifier
The voting functionality shared between all nodes of the Leios
deployment, where Network.Leios tensors it with the
diffusion network.
The certifier exposes one VotingC channel per party
(n ⨂ⁿ VotingC), and a vote cast on slot p is
party p’s vote. The caster’s identity is thus given by the
wiring, so the functionality needs no honesty predicate: an adversary
can cast only through the slots of the parties it controls.
The functionality does the following:
- it records casts without answering them
(
Cast-step), - it answers a certificate query synchronously from the vote log,
positively iff the recorded votes certify the block
(
Query-step/QueryNo-step); no certificate is delivered as an event, since in the protocol it is assembled at RB production and travels only inside the RB, - it lets the adversary read the vote log (
Read-step), as votes are public.
cert-correct) reuses
Leios.Voting.Ideal.cert-correct: if the adversary controls
fewer than threshold parties, every certificate is backed
by a vote cast through a slot it does not control. This is a counting
argument over slots; that such a voter validated the block is not proved
here.
Channels
State and certification
The functionality
Certificate correctness
The log maps into Leios.Voting.Ideal with
honest as “not corrupt” and Validated as
HasVoteFor lg. Under that choice every logged vote is
well-formed by construction, so wf and covers
hold for any log.